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School of Law

Foreword
In the early 1960s the United States Supreme Court struck down a
Connecticut law that made it a crime to use “any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception.” Estelle Griswold, the
Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, was
arrested when the New Haven Planned Parenthood clinic provided
contraceptive counseling and prescriptions. She was convicted and
appealed, culminating in the landmark 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut
decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas concluded that a right to
privacy, while not established by the text of the Bill of Rights, is found in
the penumbra of other rights; concurring opinions relied also on the due
process clause and the Ninth Amendment.
The fifty years since Griswold v. Connecticut have seen no abatement
in the debate over the margins and underpinnings of this decision. This
anniversary of the decision is a proper moment to revisit the debate, and
separating heat from light, allowing us to reflect and discover some of the
themes running through it. This is especially fruitful given how much has
changed since the Griswold decision. New reproductive technologies have
enabled us to create and define family in ways barely contemplated at that
time. And new law in other areas of human rights and regulation of private
sexuality has enriched the field in which Griswold sits.
At the same time, we find that the most fundamental issues underlying
Griswold endure. As our panelists Cary Franklin and Kim Buchanan argued,
high among those is the class-based nature of the debate. It was an open
secret during the 1950s and 1960s in Connecticut as elsewhere that
contraception was available to women who could afford a private doctor. It
was only the actions of the Planned Parenthood clinic, making reproductive
self-determination available to poor women, that prompted the criminal
prosecution that was appealed to the Supreme Court. Then, as now, the
debate over contraception, and more recently abortion, has as a practical
matter centered over social control over the bodies of women of outclasses.
As Priscilla Smith argues in Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning
from Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First Century, many of the
justifications for limiting women’s access to contraception, when examined,
reveal an underlying motive of seeking to relegate women to traditional roles
as mothers, and not necessarily at the times of their choosing. Smith finds
that arguments presented amid concerns for physical health, when examined
critically, are founded on a more basic discomfort over women’s ability to
choose and enjoy sex for its own sake.

On a more general level, Griswold was one of a number of cases
highlighting the persistent role of the state in regulating intimate conduct.
As Melissa Murray points out in Griswold’s Criminal Law, the Griswold
decision follows a long line of cases, statutes, and scholarly and public
debates over the use of the criminal law to control private behavior. In
particular, one can find in these cases a theme of laws “protecting” women
from the consequences of exercising their own liberty.
Apart from their examinations of the efforts to limit reproductive rights,
our authors also provide a rigorous constitutional framework to support
these elements of privacy in a sustainable fashion. Neil Siegel and Reva
Siegel, in Compelling Interests and Contraception, analyze the state
interests that could apply in cases like Hobby Lobby that present instances
of social control over reproductive rights. As they point out, the caselaw on
the compelling state interests that should protect these rights is inadequately
developed, and as a result often inadequately weighed. They set out a theory
of both community and personal interests that collectively justify the
compelling state interest to be protected. There are community interests in
equality, economic growth, and public health that call for protection of
women’s right to control their own bodies. At the same time there are
personal interests in dignity, self determination, and autonomy that are
worthy of constitutional consideration. In combination these community and
personal interests should be considered in assessing the importance of
constitutional protection from state regulation of private conduct.
Together with our other speakers, Douglas NeJaime, Susan Schmeiser,
Kim Buchanan, and Cary Franklin, these authors provide a powerful new
perspective on the debate following Griswold. It is the duty of legal scholars
to test and uncover the fundamental truths beneath our public debates and
search for principles. There are few areas warranting such vigorous
exploration as state control of personal conduct regarding sexuality. We
thank these scholars for sharing their explorations with us at the University
of Connecticut School of Law.
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